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TAXATION: TRIBAL TAXATION, SECRETARIAL
APPROVAL, AND STATE TAXATION-MERRION
AND BEYOND
David B. Wiles*
The power to tax is inherent in sovereignty and "essential to the
existence of independent government."I States have broad powers
to tax within their own boundaries. Within limitations, this
power includes the levy of taxes by Indian tribes on their reserva-
tions. The tribes' authority to tax is derived from retained "at-
tributes of sovereignty over both their members and their ter-
ritory." 2 This power has been described as "an essential attribute
of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-
government and territorial management." 3 At a time when
federal programs are being sharply cut and the costs of providing
public services are soaring, many state and tribal governments are
turning to taxation as a means of raising revenue. The increased
awareness of mineral-rich lands and the development of mineral
production is causing states and tribes to consider the taxing of
natural resource development. A problem arises, however, in that
a significant percentage of these natural resources are located on
Indian lands." Between the state and the tribal governments, who
has taxing authority? The mere existence of a tribal tax does not
invalidate a state tax, but to what extent may the state or tribe
impose the tax? It appears that a state may levy taxes on non-
Indians on Indian lands as long as the tax does not interfere with
the tribe's ability to self-govern. On the other hand, pursuant to
tribal sovereignty, a tribe can tax the development of natural re-
sources by non-Indians.
On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the issue of state-imposed taxes on Indian lands.5 In
* Second-place Winner, 1983 Indian Law Writing Competition
1. 71 AM. JUR. 2d State and Local Taxation § 71 (1973).
2. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
3. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). "Taxation can serve
as a mechanism to achieve the tribe's public goals, whether the goals are a distribution of
income, asset replacement, payment of development costs, rates of development, protec-
tion of natural and social environment, or merely the raising of revenues to maintain a
government." Redhouse & Smith, American Indian Tribal Taxation of Energy Resources,
22 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 659, 660 (1982).
4. Exact numbers are unknown.
5. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 102 S.Ct. 3394 (1982) (federal
law preempted tax imposed on non-Indian construction company for gross receipts re-
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Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 6
the Supreme Court held that a state tax will be upheld if it is not
federally preempted nor infringes on the tribe's right to self-
government. 7 Never has the Supreme Court addressed the in-
fringement of tribal self-government by a state-imposed severance
tax.'
In Colville, the tribe's authority to tax non-Indians was also
validated; however, this holding was limited to sales made on the
reservation. 9 On only one occasion has the United States Supreme
Court addressed a tribe-imposed severance tax. In Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe,'0 the Supreme Court held that a tribe has
inherent authority to impose a severance tax as part of its power
of self-government." Although the Supreme Court in Colville
and Merrion addressed all issues properly brought before it, addi-
tional questions concerning approval by the Secretary of the Inter-
ior of tribal tax ordinances and the extent states are allowed to tax
natural resource development remain unanswered and unsolved. I2
This note will address and analyze the following areas of con-
troversy and resolution embodied in the concept of taxation of
natural resources development on Indian lands: (1) the Supreme
ceived from tribe for construction of school for Indian children on reservation); Moe v.
Confederated Saish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Indian Reservation, 425 U.S. 463
(1976) (state barred from imposing cigarette sales tax on on-reservation sales by tribal
members to Indians living on reservation, vendor license fee on tribal member operating
shop on reservation, and personal property tax as condition precedent for registration of
motor vehicle, but allowed to require precollection of cigarette sales tax imposed by law
on non-Indian purchaser); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (state
may impose a nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax on ski resort operated by tribe on off-
reservation land leased from federal government).
6. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
7. Id. at 150-62.
8. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the Supreme
Court upheld the Montana severance tax imposed on coal mined in the state against chal-
lenges that it violated the commerce clause and the supremacy clause. However, the issue
of whether the tax infringed upon the tribe's ability to self-govern was not before the
Court.
9. Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).
10. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
11. Id. at 137-44.
12. A question unanswered by the Merrion Court and beyond the scope of this note:
Are Indian tribes to be constrained by "negative implications" of the interstate commerce
clause? See also Ragsdale, The Taxation of Natural Resources by Indian Tribes: Merrion,
A Comment, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649 (1982) (addresses implications of Merrion and
secretarial approval); Dockins, Limitations on State Power to Tax Natural Resource De-
velopment on Indian Reservations, 43 MoNT. L. REV. 217 (1982) (state cannot justify tax
that results in severance of a natural resource component from the land).
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Court's decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe and some
effects; (2) whether secretarial approval is required for ordinances
passed by tribes not organized under the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934; and (3) to what extent states may impose a tax on
natural resources developed by non-Indians on Indian lands.
Tribal Taxation: Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 3 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a tribal oil and gas severance tax against
challenges based on lack of tribal powers and violations of the
commerce clause.' 4 In Merrion, the Jicarilla Tribe enacted an ordi-
nance imposing a severance tax on oil and gas production on tribal
land.'" While the tax applied to "any oil and natural gas severed,
saved and removed from Tribal lands. ,,,16 it did not apply to
leases previously approved by the tribe and from which royalties
were being received. 7 Pursuant to the tribe's constitution, the or-
dinance was approved by the Secretary of the Interior."
Subsequently, several individuals and corporations brought ac-
tion in the federal district court of New Mexico to enjoin enforce-
ment of the severance tax. Consolidating the cases, the district
court enjoined enforcement of the tax.'9 The district court ruled
that "the Tribe lacked the authority to impose the tax, that only
state and local authority had the power to tax oil and gas produc-
tion on Indian reservations, and that the tax violated the Com-
merce Clause." 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed. 2' The court held that the power to tax is "an in-
herent attribute of tribal sovereignty that has not been divested
13. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
14. Id.
15. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Ordinance No. 77-0-02 as amended by Ordinance No.
77-0-195.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. "The ordinance was approved by the Secretary, through the Acting Director of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, on December 23, 1976." 455 U.S. 130, 136 (1982).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980). Two judges
dissented, arguing that inherent tribal sovereignty does not include the authority to im-
pose taxes on non-Indian leases. Id. at 551-56. For an examination of the rationale em-
ployed by the Tenth Circuit in deciding Merrion and other cases with natural resource is-
sues, see Note, Land and Natural Resources, 58 DEN. L.J. 415 (1981). See also Note,
Tribal Severance Taxes-Outside the Purview of the Commerce Clause, 21 NAT.
RESOURcES J. 405 (1981) (discusses court's disposition of commerce clause issue).
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by any treaty or Act of Congress." '2 2 In addition, the court found
no violation of the commerce clause. 23 Granting certiorari, ' 4 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed.25
In an opinion delivered by Justice Marshall expressing the view
of six members of the Court,26 it was held that the severance tax
was authorized by the tribe's inherent authority to tax as part of
the power of self-government and that the tax did not violate the
commerce clause. In addressing the tribe's power to impose the
severance tax, the Court found that the tribe had the inherent au-
thority to impose the tax both as a part of its power to govern
and pay costs of self-government, 27 and in its power to exclude
non-Indians from the reservation. 28 The Court noted that the
tribe's authority was not preempted by congressional enactment
of the mineral leasing acts of 192729 or 1938.30
The Court also held that the commerce clause doctrine is only
engaged when "Congress has not acted or purported to act."'"
Because Congress has provided procedures that must be followed
before a tribal tax is to take effect, and in this case the Jicarilla
Tribe fulfilled these requirements, the Court concluded that "it is
not our function nor our prerogative to strike down a tax that has
traveled through the precise channels established by Congress,
22. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 136. "They retain those powers of self-government not vol-
untarily relinguished by treaty, not divested by Congress in the exercise of its plenary au-
thority over them, or not inconsistent with the superior interests of the United States as a
sovereign nation." 617 F.2d at 541.
23. 617 F.2d at 545-46.
24. 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
25. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 136.
26. Justice Marshall was joined by Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell and O'Con-
nor, J.J.
27. 455 U.S. at 137-44.
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary
instrument of self-government and territorial management. This power enables a tribal
government to raise revenues for its essential services. The power does not derive solely
from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it de-
rives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity with-
in its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requir-
ing contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that
jurisdiction.
Id. at 137.
28. Id. at 137-44.
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 398 (a)-(e) (1976). The 1927 Act allows state taxation of mineral
production on Indian reservations.
30. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396(a)-(g) (1976). The 1938 Act establishes procedures for oil and
gas leases on tribal lands.
31. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 154.
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and has obtained the specific approval of the Secretary." '32 The
Court further noted that even if the tax could be challenged
under the interstate commerce clause, it would survive judicial
scrutiny."
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, held that the power of
the Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems not from the tribes'
inherent power of self-government but from their power to ex-
clude nonmembers.34 Furthermore, the tribe could not retro-
actively impose a tax on a lease in which the tribe had failed to re-
tain the power to challenge or alter conditions.3 5
Today, Merrion is the case in tribal taxation. In deciding as it
did, the United States Supreme Court has buried any fear held by
the Indian tribes as to their governing and regulatory authority.16
While consistent with case law upholding tribal taxing power,37
Merrion is the first case specifically to allow a tribal severance tax
on the production of oil and gas by non-Indians on tribal lands.38
In addition to confirming that Indian tribes have sovereign power
to levy taxes on non-Indians, the Court reaffirmed Congress'
ability to limit that power.39 However, as the Merrion Court in-
sisted, such congressional intent to limit a tribe's sovereign power
must be by "clear indications." The Court held: "[A] proper re-
spect for both tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary au-
thority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in
the absence of clear indications of legislative intent." ' 40 Further-
32. id. at 156.
33. Id. A tax will survive judicial scrutiny if it "is applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete
Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
34. 455 U.S. at 186.
35. Id. at 189.
36. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have given rise to question the ex-
tent of tribal powers. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribe
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981) (tribe could not regulate fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian fee land on the res-
ervation).
37. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 152 (1980), the Court held: "The power to tax transactions occurring on trust
lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sov-
ereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implica-
tions of their dependent status."
38. "Indeed, the conception of Indian sovereignty that this Court has consistently
reaffirmed permits that no other conclusion." 455 U.S. at 140.
39. Id. at 141.
40. Id. at 152, citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978). The
1982] NOTES
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more, language in the Court's opinion indicates that a general
ceding of tribal civil or criminal jurisdiction is not enough to pre-
vent tribal taxing powers.' Finally, beyond consent by the tribes
for non-Indians to conduct business on the reservation, the tribes
are under no obligation to offer governmental services in return
for the taxes. 2
Although Merrion addressed many issues, two questions re-
main for Indian mineral taxation: first, is secretarial approval re-
quired for ordinances passed by tribes not organized under the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934; and second, to what extent
are states allowed to tax mineral activity by non-Indians on In-
dian lands?
Secretarial Approval of Tribal Tax Ordinances
Case Law
What is the power of the Secretary of the Interior in approving
tribal tax ordinances? In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Re-
organization Act (IRA).4 3 Passed with the intent to provide reg-
ulatory supervision, the Act requires tribal constitutions and by-
laws to be "approved by the Secretary of the Interior."" In ad-
dition, "[a]mendments to the constitution and bylaws may be rat-
ified and approved by the Secretary in the same manner as the
original constitution and bylaws." ' 4
In Merrion, the Jicarilla Tribe organized and adopted a con-
stitution pursuant to the IRA. 6 Subsequently, the tribe revised its
constitution specifically requiring secretarial approval of all or-
dinances imposing "taxes and fees on nonmembers of the tribe
doing business on the reservation. ' 41 Because the Secretary had
approved the Jicarilla resolution as required in the tribe's con-
stitution, lack of secretarial approval was not an issue in Merrion.
Court further cautioned: "In any event, if there were ambiguity on this point, the doubt
would benefit the Tribe, for '[a]mbiguities in federal law have been construed generously
in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal
policy of encouraging tribal independence.' White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)."
41. This was argued by a United States District Court. See Southland Royalty Co. v.
Navajo Tribe, No. 79-0140, slip op. at 6 (D. Utah June 5, 1980).
42. Id. at 10.
43. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-486 (1964).
44. Id. at § 476.
45. Id.
46. 455 U.S. 130, 134 (1982).
47. Id. at 135.
[Vol. 10
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However, following Merrion, it is clear that a tribe organized
under the IRA or held to secretarial approval by its own constitu-
tion, "must obtain approval from the Secretary before it adopts
or revises its constitution to announce its intention to tax non-
members." 4"
But, what about a tribe that is not organized under the IRA or
held by its own constitution to secretarial approval; is it held to
the same standards? Lower courts have held that tribes not
organized under the IRA will be held to secretarial approval4 9
Although there is no express statutory language requiring sec-
retarial approval, congressional intent has been interpreted as re-
quiring such.
In Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe,s" and Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Navajo Tribe,5" the United States district courts for
Utah and Arizona, respectively, addressed the validity of taxes
imposed by the Navajo Tribe. In 1934 the Navajo Tribe rejected
application of the IRA.52 Furthermore, the tribe has never rat-
ified a constitution." In 1978 the tribe passed two tax resolutions.
The first, a possessory interest tax, required "any person having
ownership rights in a lease granted by the Navajo Nation to pay
an annual tax on the value of the lease site and underlying natural
resources. ' ' s4 The second, a business activity tax, required "any
person engaged in productive activity within the Navajo Nation
to pay a tax on the gross receipts. . . ."I' In both district court
cases, oil companies brought suit against the tribe to contest the
validity of the taxes.
In Southland, the court found that although there was no stat-
utory authority that expressly required secretarial approval of the
Navajo tax resolution, approval was required for several
reasons.5 6 The court reasoned that since secretarial approval is re-
quired for a tribal ordinance passed pursuant to the tribe's con-
stitution, approval is likewise required for a tribe without a con-
stitution." The court continued by saying:
48. Id. at 155.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 50-65.
50. No. 79-0140 (D. Utah June 5, 1980).
51. No. 80-247, 9 I.L.R. 3110 (D. Ariz. 1982).
52. Brief for Respondents at 6, Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe, No. 79-0140
(D. Utah June 5, 1980).
53. Id at 7.
54. Navajo Tribe Resolution, CJA-13-78.
55. Navajo Tribe Resolution, CAP-36-78.
56. Southland, slip op. at 13-16.
57. Id. at 14.
1982]
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Although Congress never intended to require a tribal constitu-
tion, Congress certainly did intend to encourage the Navajos to
adopt one. However there is no such encouragement if on the
one hand tribes adopting a constitution must have that con-
stitution approved by the Secretary, but on the other hand
tribes without a constitution may govern solely by tribal resolu-
tion without need for Secretarial approval. In fact this state of
affairs would encourage tribes not to adopt a tribal constitu-
tion, because to do so would be to place limits on tribal self-
government that would not otherwise exist. 8
In finding congressional intent, the court further noted that
under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, the Secretary must ap-
prove all oil and gas leasing on the reservation. 9 If a tribe's con-
stitution is approved pursuant to the IRA, regulatory authority
passes to the tribe.60 Without an approved constitution, the
power to regulate remains with the Secretary.6 In light of this,
the Southland court held that it appears "Congress intended to
require Secretarial approval of tribal tax resolutions, passed with-
out benefit of a tribal constitution, if such resolutions could have
a significant effect on reservation oil and gas leases.''62 In ad-
dition, "Congress intended that the Secretary would examine
these taxes to determine whether they are consistent or inconsis-
tent with the federal regulatory framework." 63 In concluding that
secretarial approval is required, the Court stated:
Congressional intent for such a requirement must be inferred
from the requirement that the Secretary approve tribal con-
stitutions, from the delegation of regulatory authority over res-
ervation oil and gas leases to the Secretary, in the absence of a
tribal constitution, and from the historical relationship between
the Interior Department and the Navajo Tribal Council. 64
The Kerr-McGee court's opinion was consistent with Southland.65
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue
of secretarial approval of ordinances passed by nonorganized
58. Id.
59. Id. at 15.
60. Id. at 14.
61. Id. at 14-15.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, No. 80-247, slip op. at 22, 9 I.L.R. 3110,
3113 (D. Ariz. 1982).
[Vol. I0
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tribes. However, in Merrion the Court's opinion does include
language supporting the result reached in Southland and Kerr-
McGee. The Merrion Court stated that:
[T]he Tribe's authority to tax nonmembers is subject to con-
straints not imposed on other governmental entities: the federal
government can take away this power, and the Tribe must ob-
tain the approval of the Secretary before any tax on non-
members can take effect. These additional constraints minimize
potential concern that Indian tribes will exercise the power to
tax in an unfair or unprincipled manner, and ensure that any
exercise of the tribal power to tax will be consistent with
national policies. 6
Following the holdings of Southland and Kerr-McGee and the
language found in Merrion, tribal taxes must be approved by the
Secretary, even if the tribe is not organized under the IRA. By re-
quiring secretarial approval, congressional intent to monitor tri-
bal authority and protect economic development and interests of
the tribe is pursued. 7 If in the future the United States Supreme
Court should specifically address secretarial approval of non-
organized tribes, Southland and Kerr-McGee should be strong in-
dications as to the outcome.
Guidelines
In response to the increase of tribal ordinances imposing taxes
on mineral activities, the Secretary of the Interior has developed
guidelines to assist in the review procedure and the standard of
review.68 Approved January 18, 1983,69 these guidelines are in-
tended to "implement the Area Directors' authority to review or
approve tribal ordinances imposing taxes on mineral activities by
suggesting a procedure by which tribes can consider interests of
66. 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
67. See F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 220-28 (ed. 1982).
68. See BuREAu OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REVIEW OF TRIBAL
ORDINANCES IMPOSING TAXES ON MINERAL AcrivITEs (Jan. 18, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
REVIEW OF TRIBAL ORDINANCES].
The patent effect of the ... regulations is to make it enormously more difficult for
tribes to enact severance taxes and get them approved; to make it vastly easier for the
Secretary to disapprove such ordinances on the simple ground that they fail to meet any
one of a number of complicated, costly and time-consuming requirements; and to make
any ordinance which is approved much more vulnerable to legal challenge from the
resource companies which would pay a tribal severance tax.
15 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW NEWSLETrER 20 (1982).
69. The guidelines were approved by Ken Smith, Assistant Secretary of Indian Af-
fairs.
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persons affected by their taxing ordinances, and by establishing a
standard for review of such ordinances by the Area Directors." 7 0
Furthermore, they are to "assist Indian tribes in the exercise of
their inherent authority to tax mineral activities within their jur-
isdiction. ' 71
Procedures precedent to the enactment of a tribal ordinance re-
quire that the tribe obtain approval from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs superintendent," who in turn submits it to the area
director for review. In pursuing approval, the tribe is required to
submit written notice of its intent to enact an ordinance to the su-
perintendent; 7" the superintendent is to give notice to the public; 74
and then the tribe has the option to hold a public hearing." If the
tribe fails to give (1) written notice, (2) a transcript of any public
hearing held, or (3) other documentations believed to be im-
portant for review by the tribe, the superintendent will disap-
prove the ordinance. 76 If the ordinance is approved, all docu-
mentation is forwarded to the area director.77 The area director
will disapprove the tribal ordinance if it is found that:
(1) "The tribe has failed to comply with the [written notice and
submission of documents] requirements. ... " ;78
(2) "The ordinance was enacted by a tribal governing body to
which the tribe's constitution, if the tribe has a constitution, has
not delegated the power to impose the tax"; 79
(3) "The ordinance does not provide a procedure, in the ordi-
nance itself or by reference to other tribal law, by which a tax-
payer may contest his or her tax liability, and be afforded a right'
to a hearing before a tribal forum other than the body which
enacted the tax"; 80 or
(4) "The ordinance violates federal or tribal law."'"
70. REVIEW OFTRIBAL ORDINANCES, supra note 68, at 1.1(A) (1). The area director is
defined as "the Bureau of Indian Affairs official in charge of an Area Office who ... ex-
ercises the Secretary's authority to approve or disapprove tribal ordinances. . . ." Id. at
1.2(A).
71. Id. at 1.1(A) (2).
72. The superintendent is defined as "the Bureau of Indian Affairs Official in charge
of an agency office. . . ." Id. at 1.2(G).
73. Id. at 1.3(A).
74. Id. at 1.3(B).
75. Id. at 1.3(C).
76. Id. at 1.3(E).
77. Id. at 1.4(B).
78. Id. at 1.6(B) (1).
79. Id. at 1.6(B) (2).
80. Id. at 1.6(B) (3).
81. Id. at 1.6(B) (4).
[Vol. 10
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Furthermore, the guidelines provide that all decisions are sub-
ject to appeal.8 " The question of whether the grounds for disap-
proval by the area director are supported by, or comport with,
federal Indian law has not yet been considered by the courts.
Finally, these guidelines specifically state that they are to apply
only where secretarial approval is expressly required by federal
law or provided for in the tribe's constitution.13 Those tribes
without a constitution or tribal ordinance restricting their au-
thority "will be considered to possess the authority to exercise the
inherent power of the tribe to tax." 4 By narrowing the scope of
these guidelines, in effect what has emerged is a clear distinction
between tribes that have organized and tribes that have not
organized pursuant to the IRA. While this is inconsistent with
Southland and Kerr-McGee, it is consistent with current federal
policy and United States Supreme Court case law. However, it is
reasonable to assume that as the question of whether to require
nonorganized tribes to obtain secretarial approval is more
thoroughly discussed by the Supreme Court, these guidelines will
eventually be applicable to all tribes, organized or nonorganized.
In support of this proposition, as stated in Southland, if a tribe is
not required to obtain secretarial approval absent a constitution
or tribal ordinance requiring such, the intent and purpose of the
IRA would be burdened by placing limitations on tribes that did
organize under the Act, 5 a result Congress and the courts have
earnestly fought to prevent.
State Taxation in Indian Country
In Merrion the Supreme Court limited its holding to the valid-
ity of the tribal severance tax. But, what about a state severance
tax? Suppose a state wishes to place a severance tax on the de-
velopment of the same materials being taxed by the Indian tribe,
what result? We know that the mere existence of a tribal tax does
not invalidate a state tax,8 6 but to what extent may the state im-
pose such a tax?
States have broad powers to tax within their own boundaries.
The problem arises when determining the boundaries and rights
between state regulatory authority and tribal self-government.
82. Id. at 1.7.
83. Id. at ,I.I(B).
84. Id. at 1.6(B) (2) (b).
85. Southland, slip op. at 14.
86. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 147.
19821 NOTES
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Departing from the strict notion that states have no power on In-
dian reservations 7 and recognizing that Indian tribes retain "at-
tributes of sovereignty over both their members and their ter-
ritory,""8 a simple determination of the validity of a state tax is
clouded. It has long been recognized that states have no power to
tax Indian trust lands,8 9 nontrust property owned by a tribal
member on tribal land, 90 and income earned by a tribal member
on tribal land. 91 On the other hand, courts have allowed states to
impose taxes on Indians outside Indian boundaries,9 2 property
owned by non-Indians within Indian boundaries, 93 and income
earned by non-Indians on Indian lands.94 The law is unsettled as
to the validity of a state severance tax on minerals on Indian
lands. However, it appears that the same limitations that have ap-
plied in previous state-imposed tax cases would also apply to a
state severance tax. These limitations fall into two categories: (1)
the exercise of the state's authority to tax may be federally pre-
empted, 9 and (2) the state might unlawfully infringe "on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them. ' 96 Although these limitations are related, each can
stand alone as a possible barrier to state regulatory authority.9 7
87. "[T]he laws of [a State] can have no force." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
88. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
89. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867).
90. Brajan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
91. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
92. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
93. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
94. Kahn v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 16 Ariz. App. 17, 490 P.2d 846 (1971), app. dis-
missed, 411 U.S. 941 (1973).
95. See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
96. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See also Washington v. Yakima In-
dian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979); Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty,
and Continuing Problems of State Encroachment into Indian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 65 (1981) (author explores the role of the United States Supreme Court in providing
Indians protection against attempted state intrusions). At least one commentator has
broken down the two barriers into a three-level test to determine if a state may apply a
tax:
First, is the area preempted by the federal government? If so, then the state cannot ap-
ply its tax; if not, then: Second, does the state have a legitimate interest? If not, then
the state cannot apply its tax; if so, then: Third, does the tax infringe on the tribe's
rights? If so, then the state cannot apply its tax; if not, then the state may apply its tax.
Note, Taxation: State Taxation of Indian Transactions: The Test after Colville, White In-
dian Apache, and Central Machinery, 8 AM. INDIAN L. Rv. 419, 428 (1981) (emphasis in
original).
97. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (citations
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Preemption
Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the
Indian commerce clause. 9 Absent express congressional au-
thorization, direct state taxation of tribal property or members is
presumed to be preempted. 99 However, if a taxation scheme for
non-Indians on Indian land does not conflict with federal statutes
or treaties, or interfere with the ability of the tribe to govern it-
self, express congressional authorization is not needed to uphold
the tax. 100
The classic preemption case is Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ari-
zona Tax Commission.'0' In Warren, Arizona levied a gross pro-
ceeds tax on a retailer federally licensed to do business on the
Navajo Reservation. Finding "comprehensive federal regulation
of Indian traders,"' 02 the Court concluded that "Congress has
taken the business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in
hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional
burdens upon traders."'0 3
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,'0" the Supreme
Court found Arizona taxes preempted by federal law.' 0 In
Bracker, Arizona sought to impose a motor carrier license and
fuel tax on a non-Indian logging company doing business on In-
dian land. 0 6 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Mar-
shall found that express congressional intent is not required to
preempt state law,'0 only that the state scheme conflict with the
intent of a federal statute or regulatory purpose. On the other
omitted):
The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient
basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by
tribal members. They are related, however, in two important ways. The right of tribal
self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Con-
gress. Even so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in
our jurisprudence that they have provided an important "back-drop," against which
vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322-23 (1978).
99. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 376-77; Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-81; Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148.
100. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 148.
101. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
102. Id. at 688.
103. Id. at 690.
104. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
105. Id. at 141-53.
106. Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-601, 641 (repealed 1979).
107. 448 U.S. at 144.
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hand, some weight must be given to the state's legitimate and reg-
ulatory interest.108 Therefore, whether a state statute is preempted
depends on "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the State,
Federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to deter-
mine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state au-
thority would violate federal law." 09 Finding comprehensive fed-
eral regulation of the harvesting and sale of Indian timber," 0 fed-
eral policy supporting federal regulation and no legitimate state
interest in imposing the tax, the Bracker Court concluded that
there was no room for the additional burden and found the state
tax impermissible.II
In Merrion the Court addressed only the validity of the tribal
severance tax. What would happen if in that case New Mexico at-
tempted to tax minerals found on the tribe's reservation? Would
the New Mexico severance tax be preempted by federal law? In
Crow Tribe v. Montana, ' 2 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed a similar issue. There the court found an attempt by
Montana to impose a severance and gross proceeds tax preempted
by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 and infringing upon the
tribe's right to self-government." 3 The Montana tax was "im-
posed on each ton of coal produced in the state,"" 4 produced
meaning "severed from the earth.""' , In addition, the tax rate
could vary from 3% to 30% of the value of the coal, depending
on the value, energy content, and method of extraction." 6 The
legislative intent for its passage was revenue-raising as well as reg-
ulatory." 7 Attempting to invalidate the tax, the Crow Tribe
argued that federal regulation was so broad in the field of mineral
leasing that no room was left for state taxation and regulation." '8
Turning to the legislative intent and purpose of the 1938 Act,
the Crow court found that the federal act was designed to achieve
108. Id.
109. Id. at 145.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 151.
112. 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). See Recent Development, Indian Law-Taxation
of Non-Indians Transacting Business on Reservations-State Taxes Imposed Upon Non-
Indian Mineral Lessees Infringe Tribal Right of Self-Government. Crow Tribe of Indians
v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 705 (1982).
113. 650 F.2d at 1107.
114. MONT. CODE ANt. § 15-35-103 (1979).
115. Id. § 15-35-102.
116. Id. § 15-35-103.
117. 650 F.2d at 1113-14.
118. Id. at 1111.
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three goals: (1) "uniformity in the law governing mineral leases
on Indian lands"; 19 (2) "help achieve the broad policy of the In-
dian Reorganization Act of 1934.... ";'2o and (3) "encourage
tribal economic development .... ,,121 Weighing this, the court
found the Montana tax invalid. In preempting the state tax, the
court held that the Montana tax conflicted with the 1938 Act,
particularly with the statutory goal of encouraging tribal ec-
onomic development and self-government.' 22 The court stated
that "the magnitude of the tax will prevent the Tribe from re-
ceiving a large portion of the economic benefits of its coal."' 23
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has,
under different circumstances, upheld the same Montana tax pre-
empted in Crow. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,'24
the Supreme Court upheld the tax against claims that the tax was
inconsistent with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.125 Different
from the Act addressed in Crow, appellants argued that the tax
reduced the royalty payments due the federal government pro-
vided under the 1920 Act.,26 The Court held that "even assuming
that the Montana tax may reduce royalty payments to the Federal
government under leases executed in Montana, this fact alone
hardly demonstrates that the tax is inconsistent with the 1920
Act."'2 7 In upholding the tax, the Court further held that the tax
was not preempted by the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Act of
1978 nor did it frustrate national energy policies.' 2'
Although Warren, Bracker, and Crow found state attempts to
tax preempted by federal law, notwithstanding possible infringe-
ment of tribal self-government, Edison clearly establishes the
validity of a state-imposed severance tax on coal and other min-
erals.
Tribal Self-Government
It is recognized that Indian tribes retain "attributes of sov-
ereignty over both their members and their territory." '29 It is this
119. Id. at 1112.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1113.
123. Id.
124. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
125. Id. at 629-33. See supra note 8.
126. Id. at 629-30.
127. Id. at 631.
128. Id. at 633-36.
129. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). See also Santa Clara Pueblo
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recognized status that presents a second hurdle for a state in im-
posing taxes on tribal members and Indian lands. In Williams v.
Lee,'3 the question of a state's civil adjudicatory jurisdiction was
addressed. The petitioner, a non-Indian, brought a civil action
against an Indian for the price of goods sold on the Navajo Res-
ervation. 3 ' The Court announced that the test to be applied in
determining jurisdiction between tribal and state courts is that
"absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always
been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 13 2 Hold-
ing that the exercise of state jurisdiction might undermine the
tribe's right to self-govern, the Court concluded that exclusive ju-
risdiction was in the tribal courts.' 33 In finding tribal jurisdiction
the Court held:
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on
the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place
there. The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the au-
thority of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress
recognized this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868,
and has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken away
from them, it is for Congress to do it.'34
In light of Williams and subsequent case law supporting the
proposition that a state may impose its laws upon non-Indians on
tribal lands,'35 what is the effect of a state severance tax on min-
eral development on tribal lands? Does such a tax infringe on
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 436 U.S. 313, 323
(1978).
130. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
131. Id. at 217-18.
132. Id. at 220.
133. Id. at 223. D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
281 (1978): "Not all courts saw Williams v. Lee as an obstacle to state jurisdiction....
[M]any state courts read Williams as creating a presumption of state jurisdiction not pre-
cluded by federal law unless it could be shown that tribal self-government would be im-
paired." See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962): "Decisions
indicate that even on reservations state laws may be applied to Indians unless such ap-
plication would interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right granted or re-
served by federal law."
134. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (citations omitted).
135. In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1972), the Court
stated:
It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with
situations involving non-Indians. In these situations, both the tribe and the State could
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tribal self-government? It is clear that the existence of a tribal tax
does not automatically invalidate a state tax." 6 Furthermore, ec-
ononic impact on the tribe's ability to raise revenue may still not
be sufficient to defeat the tax.'37 However, on at least one occa-
sion, the United States Supreme Court has implied that if the reg-
ulatory objectives of a tribal tax are impermissibly interfered with
by a state tax, that tax may be invalid on grounds of infringement
of tribal self-government.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reserva-
tion,'38 the Court upheld an excise tax that allowed the state to
tax on-reservation sales of cigarettes by Indians to non-Indians.'3 9
Dismissing arguments of federal preemption and impermissible
interference with tribal self-government, the Court stated:
The principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of
inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an ac-
commodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Fed-
eral Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on
the other. While the Tribes do have an interest in raising rev-
enues for essential governmental programs, that interest is
strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated
on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when
the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. The State also
has a legitimate governmental interest in raising revenues, and
that interest is likewise strongest when the tax is directed at off-
reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state
services. 40
fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdiction. The Williams test was
designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up
to the point where tribal self-government would be affected.
136. In Crow, the Ninth Circuit, summarizing the Supreme Court holding in Colville,
stated:
Tribal economic activity, while perhaps providing the wherewithal for tribal govern-
ments to sustain themselves, is at best indirectly linked to the effectiveness of tribal
government. It is clear that a state tax is not invalid merely because it erodes a tribe's
revenues, even when the tax substantially impairs the tribal government's ability to sus-
tain itself and its programs.
650 F.2d 1104, 1116.
137. See Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d
1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
138. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
139. Id. at 155. The Court noted that: "The value marketed by the smokeshops to
persons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which
the Tribes have significant interest."
140. Id. at 156-57 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
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Following Colville, it is clear that a state may tax a non-Indian on
a reservation, even if that non-Indian is already taxed by the
tribe. What is not clear is the proof required to invalidate a state
tax because of its infringement on tribal self-government. To
what standard will the courts hold the burdened tribe? In Crow,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided such a standard. In
invalidating the Montana tax, the court stated: "[T]he Tribe must
show that the taxes substantially affect its ability to offer govern-
mental services or its ability to regulate the development of tribal
resources, and that the balance of state and tribal interests
renders the state's assertion of taxing authority unreasonable." ' 4'
Evidenced by federal and state court decisions, states may
apply their laws to non-Indians on a reservation if the application
is authorized by Congress or state jurisdiction does not constitute
an interference with federal Indian policies or infringe on tribal
self-government. Having received the approval of the United
States Supreme Court in Colville, there is no doubt that a state
may impose a cigarette excise tax and general sales tax on on-res-
ervation purchases of cigarettes by non-Indians. Although Col-
ville did not entertain Indian mineral taxation, case law has es-
tablished some standards that must be met for a state-imposed
severance tax to be found valid. In determining the validity of a
state severance tax, the following questions should be kept in
mind:
1. Does Congress expressly provide or prohibit the state the
authority to impose the tax?
2. What are the federal policies promoting tribal self-suf-
ficiency and economic development?
3. What is the nature of the state, the federal, and the tribal
interest at stake?
4. What are the legitimate interests of the state in imposing
the tax?
5. What is the effect of the economic impact on the Indian
tribe?
6. What is the impact on the tribe's ability to govern itself ef-
fectively?
7. Does the tax substantially affect the tribe's ability to reg-
ulate the development of tribal resources?
8. Balancing state and tribal interests, is the state-imposed tax
unreasonable?
The spectrum of state taxation is broad. Although the Supreme
141. 650 F.2d at 1117.
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Court has yet to speak on several issues of natural resource de-
velopment on Indian lands, if the guidelines set forth in Williams
and Warren are followed and the criteria established by Colville,
Bracker, Crow, and other cases are complied with, the power of a
state to impose severance taxes on Indian reservations will not in-
terfere with federal law or policies nor infringe on the ability of
the tribe to self-govern and will, therefore, be upheld as valid.
Conclusion
With increased awareness of mineral-rich lands and heightened
revenue needs, states and tribes are looking toward natural re-
source development more frequently as a tax source. With the
passage of Merrion, it is clear that a tribe has inherent authority
to impose a severance tax as part of its power of self-government.
Whether secretarial approval of a tribal ordinance is a precondi-
tion to its validity is unclear. However, following Southland,
Kerr-McGee, and language in Merrion, secretarial approval is re-
quired for tribes whether organized or nonorganized under the
IRA.
While the mere existence of a tribal tax does not invalidate a
state tax, states are limited to some extent as to their taxing au-
thority. Withstanding a challenge of federal preemption, Colville
allows for state taxation of mineral developments on Indian lands
so long as the tax does not interfere with tribal self-government.
To what extent a state may tax until interference occurs will be
determined by the courts. However, in reviewing a state tax, a
court will want to look at the ability of the tribe to offer govern-
mental services, its ability to regulate, and whether in light of
tribal and state interests, the tax is unreasonable. Finally, whether
a state- or a tribe-imposed severance tax will increase revenue or
decrease natural resource development will only be answered by
time.
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